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Life Without Lemon:
The Status of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence After
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
INTRODUCTION

On its face, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is clear:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' The Clause expresses the principles
of the Framers of the Constitution that "religion is too personal, too sacred,
too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate. '
Although a great deal of confusion has engulfed modem Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the
underlying principles declared by the Founding Fathers.3 The principles
upon which the Establishment Clause is based are simple: the government
must not favor religion over irreligion, nor should the government financially support religion.4
To protect these principles, the Supreme Court developed a three-prong
Establishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 This three-prong model

is a multi-variable approach that is generally applied by the Court in a
context-specific manner.6 However, despite the test's useful framework,7

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (citing 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial
and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments, in The Writings of James Madison 183,
187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
3. For a more complete explanation of the Court's adherence to these principles, see
Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juicefrom Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the
EstablishmentClause, 22 N. KY. L. REv. 621, 622-632 (1995).
4. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. The Court explained that "a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally

established religion... " creates hostility toward religious minorities. Id. at 431-32.
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. The three prongs of the Lemon test are: the statute or government action must
have a secular purpose; the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and the statute or government action must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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the Court, along with many commentators, has since refuted the Lemon test
and its three-pronged analysis, adopting a more accommodating model.'
Supporters of such an approach contend the Framers of the Constitution
intended merely for the government to remain neutral when dealing with
religious entities.9
Consequently, although the twenty-year-old test created in Lemon
consists of values expressed by the majority of the current Court,' ° recent
Supreme Court decisions have attempted to abandon the Lemon test."
However, the Court has been unable to embrace an acceptable replacement.
Nevertheless, after blatant disregard for the Lemon test 2 in Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,'3 it is clear that the
Court is on the verge of overruling the test and endorsing a test of
neutrality. Whether the Court accepts the "benevolent neutrality" model or
creates yet another approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one
must begin to ponder life without Lemon.
This note analyzes Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia 4 and determines that the Court misapplied Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District,5 a recent Supreme Court
case, and erroneously rejected the three-prong Lemon test by again applying
8. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (failing to mention Lemon

and creating a coercion test instead); Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994)

(using a test of "benevolent neutrality"); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. (1971) (extensively discussing the concept of neutrality
in the face of the Lemon decision); Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 795, 797 (1993); Michael M. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Gary J. Simson, The
EstablishmentClause in the Supreme Court: Rethinkingthe Court 's Approach, 72 CORNELL

L. REV. 905, 908-35 (1987) (asserting that the purpose prong of the test is much too narrow,
and the excessive entanglement prong is altogether unnecessary).
9. For a complete explanation of the neutrality model as used by the Supreme Court,
see Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487 (1994).
10. For a more detailed look at the usefulness of the Lemon test, see supra note 4 and

accompanying text; see also Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?.: A Comment on Professor
Paulsen'sLemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 883, 884 n.7 (1993) (citing numerous
lower court cases that continue to utilize all three prongs of the Lemon test); Daniel 0.
Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 874-75 (1993) (emphasizing that the
Lemon test survives, if not mentioned specifically in Supreme Court decisions, at least in
spirit).
11. See, e.g., infra note 82-87 and accompanying text.
12. The Lemon test was only mentioned in the closing paragraph of the dissenting

opinion. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. at 2551.
13. 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
14. Id.
15. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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a neutrality standard. Neutrality is the current rule of thumb of several16
Supreme Court justices regarding Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
However, the Lemon test, if properly applied, is a more concrete standard.
In examining this decision, Part I of this note provides a brief historical
overview of the development of the numerous tests surrounding the
Establishment Clause, focusing primarily on the Court's allusive treatment
of the Clause during the past fifty years. Part II tenders the facts of
Rosenberger and presents the procedural history of the case. In addition,
Part II discusses the various opinions written by the Supreme Court Justices
in Rosenberger. Part III analyzes the ambiguous "benevolent neutrality" test
subscribed to by the majority and then applies the Lemon test to the facts of
the case. Furthermore, Part III expresses some practical ramifications of this
decision on modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence and future Supreme
Court decisions. Finally, Part IV concludes that Rosenberger, while on the
brink of overruling Lemon, merely created chaos in the midst of confusion.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
One of the first modem views of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
depicted the Clause as a "wall of separation between church and state."' 7
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court announced the separational rule
that a "wall" should exist between government and religion. 8 In Everson
v. Board of Education,9 the Court held that the First Amendment was
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.2 ° Everson
challenged a New Jersey statute that allowed for the transportation of
students to parochial schools and authorized the reimbursement of transportation costs to their parents. 2 ' Justice Black, after a lengthy history of the
fears surrounding the creation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment,22 acknowledged that the clause prohibiting religious establish16. See generally Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
17. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
18. Id.
19. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

20. Id. at 15. The Fourteenth Amendment declares: "[N]or shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 8-15. For further discussions on the history of the First Amendment
Establishment Clause, see infra note 210 and accompanying text; see also R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:

(1982).

HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION

20-23
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ment was "intended to erect a 'wall of separation between church and
state."' 23 The Court's majority opinion enunciated an often repeated
absolutist definition of establishment of religion principles.24 Moreover,
Justice Black concluded the wall between State and religion should be "kept
high and impregnable."25
The following year, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, Justice Black, again delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court,
made reference to his statements in Everson, stipulating complete exclusion
of religion in public schools. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum, a school board
allowed religious instructors to conduct classes in secondary school
classrooms during school hours.27 The Court ruled the level of involvement in the case had reached beyond permissible heights and was therefore
unconstitutional.2" Justice Black reasoned the public school's entanglement
with religion was "beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established
...public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith."29
In closing, the majority emphasized that church and state can achieve their
best results if they operate separately, each in their own world."a
Shortly thereafter, the Court of the 1950s recognized the defects of the
"wall" analysis and began to stress the government's obligation to accommodate religion.3 In Zorach v. Clauson,32 the Court held that although
separation between church and state must be "complete and unequivocal, 3 3
23. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
24. Id. at 15. A portion of Justice Black's opinion reads as follows:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion ....
Id. at 15-16.
25. Id.at 18.
26. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
27. Id. at 205.
28. Id. at 212.
29. Id. at 210. In McCollum, Justice Black reiterated that "[n]o tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion" (citing the
dissent's acknowledgement that the First Amendment forbids any appropriation of public
funds to support religion). Id.
30. Id. at 212. For a more complete discussion surrounding Everson and McCollum,
see Marilyn Perrin, Lee v. Weisman: UnansweredPrayers,21 PEPP. L. REv. 207 (1993).
31. See generally Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
32. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
33. Id. at 312.

1996]

LIFE WITHOUT LEMON

127

we are a nation of religious people and therefore, we must tolerate religious
accommodation.34 A New York statute permitted students who wished to
participate in religious classes during school hours to be released to attend
devotional instruction." The Supreme Court upheld the state law by
admitting that one has a right to exercise freely in some respects. The
majority recognized the nullification of the statute would have extremely
"wide and profound" effects on our sectarian (religious) nation.3 6 However, the Court declared that where separation of church and state is required
by the
Constitution, that separation must remain complete and unequivo37
cal.
Consequently, the Court reaffirmed complete separation between public
government and personal religion.38 In Engel v. Vitale,39 the majority
revisited one of the First Amendment's important purposes: to prevent a
union of government and religion. However, in doing so, the Court
reconstructed an analysis that resembled a blurred barrier rather than a
distinct wall.4" In Engel, primary public school students were lead in a
voluntary, brief moment of daily prayer before morning class work
began.4" The Court held that nondenominational prayer in public schools
was unconstitutional. 2 Although the majority admitted that complete
separation of church and state may be impossible, the Court emphasized the
government should attempt to prevent any union of the two sectors.43
With Establishment Clausejurisprudence in a state of considerable flux,
the 1970s produced two decisions attempting to solidify an analytical model.
In Walz v. Tax Commission,44 property tax exemptions for religious groups
were alleged to be unconstitutional by a state property owner.45 The Court,
34. Id. at 313-15.
35. Id. at 308-09.
36. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
37. Id. at 312.
38. For further discussion on the Court's fluctuating Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Christian M. Keiner, A CriticalAnalysisof ContinuingEstablishmentClause Flux
as Illustratedby Lee v. Weisman and GraduationPrayerCaseLaw, 24 PAC. L.J. 401(1993).
39. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
40. Id. at 425 (1962)(stating that the prohibition against establishment of religion at
least meant that government had no business in developing school prayer to be recited as part
of a religious activity).
41. Id. at 422. The prayer, as adopted by the state Board of Regents, was as follows:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id.
42. Id. at 433-36.
43. Id. at 434-35.
44. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
45. Id. at 666-67.
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led by Justice Burger, emphasized the difficulty of effectively applying a
neutrality test to the constitutionality of states' actions. He declared "[t]he
course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely
straight line . *."..46
Within the extremes of prohibition of establishment
versus prohibition of interference with religion there is a great deal of
'leeway. 47 Instead, the line drawn must protect against "excessive entanglement."4 Consequently, the Court declared that because the exemption
neither advanced nor inhibited religion, the allowance did not violate the
Establishment Clause.4 9
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court continued to enunciate a
more definitive explanation of a modem Establishment Clause analysis by
announcing a test that included Justice Burger's excessive entanglement
concerns." The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman5 ruled that two states' acts
were invalid because they failed a three-prong test.52 In Lemon, a Rhode
Island statute provided for a fifteen percent salary supplement for teachers
instructing in sectarian schools, and a Pennsylvania law authorized the state
to provide nonsecular schools with secular educational services such as
textbooks and other instructional aids. 3 The Court realized this was an
extremely sensitive area of constitutional law, and the constitutional
'
prohibitions were "at best opaque."54
As a result, the Court utilized the
evils mentioned in Walz to formulate the public concerns into a flexible,
three-prong test: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"5
For several years, the newly adopted Lemon test failed to be examined
by the Court using all three prongs of the analysis. However, in 1976, the
Supreme Court analyzed each component of the flexible three-prong test in
Roemer v. Board of Public Works.56 Applying the newly established
46. Id. at 669.

47. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. Although difficult to apply, Justice Burger called for
government to act in a benevolently neutral manner when approaching religion. Id.
48. Id. at 668-70 (pronouncing the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit state
sponsorship, financial support, or active interference in religious activities).
49. Id. at 672.
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
52. Id. at 613-14; see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-10.
54. Id.at 612.
55. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
56. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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Lemon test, the Court upheld a Maryland statute providing public aid in the
form of a grant given to eligible colleges and universities.57 Although the
yearly grants were disbursed to "church-affiliated" colleges, the district court
held that the program had a secular purpose of supporting education.5"
The Court continued to analyze the remaining two prongs: stating that the
primary effect was neither to advance nor inhibit religion because religion
was not so dominant in these colleges as to consume the funds supplied by
the state, and that entanglement between government and religion was not
excessive because the subsidy was merely an annual donation.59
However, in the 1980s, the Justices of the Supreme Court became
confused and discontent with what was initially hailed an acceptable
analytical solution. First, in 1983, Chief Justice Burger departed entirely
from the 1971 Lemon test in his majority opinion in Marsh v. Chambers60
sanctifying legislative sessions that opened with a word of prayer. The
majority opinion in Marsh refused to acknowledge the Lemon test.6
Instead, the Court held such a relationship between government and religion
was constitutionally acceptable because of the nation's "history and
tradition" supporting religious dedications at the beginning of each
legislative session.62
The Court continued adding to the list of plausible tests in Lynch v.
Donnelly.63 In Lynch, Justice Burger, delivering the opinion of the Court,
held that displaying a creche in the town square, along with other symbols
of the Christmas season, did not violate the Establishment Clause. 64 The
underpinnings of the holding were not based on the aforementioned Lemon
test, but rather the rational basis for the Court's holding was an "unbroken
history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of

57. Id. at 766-67.
58. Id. at 754 (appellants did not challenge the determination of this prong of the
Lemon test as made by the lower court).
59. Id. at 759-66. Had the "donation" occurred more frequently, perhaps once a
month, then the state would have violated the "excessive" entanglement prong. Id.
60. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
61. Id. Although the majority opinion refused to recognize the Lemon test, the appellate
court diligently applied all three prongs. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
62. Id. at 786-792. "Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses
did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment,
for the practice .. .has continued without interruption ever since that early session of

Congress." Id. at 788.

63. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
64. Id. at 687. The test used in Lynch has since come to be known as the "two plastic
reindeer" test because the Court reasoned that a public display of the creche was valid if
placed between two plastic reindeer, but not if placed alone. Id. at 680-81.
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the role of religion in American life . . . ." Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion, emphasized that she supported the acknowledgement of
religious traditions; however, one should be aware of the blurred line
between simple acknowledgement and impermissible government endorsement of such religious activities.66
A few years later, the Court framed the "endorsement" test alluded to
by Justice O'Connor, ruling that a state law providing for a moment of
silence in public schools is unconstitutional in Wallace v. Jaffree.67 In
Wallace, the state passed a statute specifically permitting public schools to
have a moment of silence during the class day for meditation or silent
prayer."8 The majority of the Court reasoned that the statute had a
sectarian purpose because of the inclusion of the word prayer.69 In
addition, the primary effect would be to enhance religion by providing a
platform in public schools to promote prayer.70 Consequently, the Court
held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause because the statute
"characterize[d] prayer as a favored practice," resulting in State endorsement
of religion.7 Even though the majority attested to applying the Lemon
test, the Court created yet another mode of analysis by melting the first and
second prong into a new endorsement test.
In School District v. Ball,72 a judgement rendered only months after
Wallace v. Jaffree,73 the Supreme Court remained faithful to the Lemon
test.74 In Ball, two Michigan primary and secondary school programs
reserved periods of time during the regular school day for students to attend
classes offered as a supplement to their basic curriculum.75 These programs provided classes for non-public school students at public expense in
non-public classrooms.76 The Ball Court ruled that the programs were
unconstitutional.77 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, listed three
different aspects by which the provisions violated the "primary effect" prong

65. Id. at 674.
66. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

472 U.S. 38 (1985).
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
Id. at 375.
Id.at 378.
Id.at 397-98.

42.
58-60.
59.
60.

72. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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of the Lemon test.7" First, the teachers may promote religious beliefs due
to the absence of monitoring.79 Second, the government programs may be
seen as a "symbolic link" between state and church in the eyes of youngsters. Finally, providing such public funds may free up funds otherwise
used for sectarian purposes or functions.8" The Court, in closing, recognized that although the Clause has few absolutes, the Establishment Clause
does undoubtedly prohibit government financed programs to promote the
beliefs of any one religion.8
With the arrival of the 1990s came another model with which to
explore the Establishment Clause. In Lee v. Weisman,82 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, held that a graduation
invocation at a high school ceremony was unconstitutional.83 In Lee,
students in attendance at their middle school graduation ceremony listened

while a rabbi, chosen by the school principal, recited an invocation and

benediction.84 The rabbi was given prayer guidelines by the principal."
Focusing not on the Lemon test, but rather on an "unconstitutional coercion"
test, the Court emphasized that the pressure felt by the students to bow their
heads in silence or pray exhibited extremely coercive conditions, particularly
when considering the tender age of the students involved.8 6 Consequently,

78. Id. at 397; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
79. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
80. Id.
81. Id. This once again emphasizes the one Establishment Clause absolute determined
in Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314, and reiterated in Engel, 370 U.S. at 429.
82. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
83. Id. at 599.
84. Id. at 581. Rabbi Gutterman's invocation prayer is as follows:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where diversity
is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these
young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to
guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for
its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we honor
this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop
Middle School so live that they might help share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope
for the future, be richly fulfilled.
Amen.
Id. at 581-582.
85. Id. at 581.
86. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93.
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the graduation invocation failed the "coercion" test and the prayer was
declared unconstitutional.8 7
However, during the same term, the Court revived the three-prong
Lemon test in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
8
In Lamb's Chapel, the Lamb's Chapel Church brought a suit
District."
against the school district claiming that the district had violated the Church's
constitutional rights by denying it access to a school room for the showing
of an evening film series.8 9 The Court diligently applied the first two
prongs of the Lemon test and held that allowing the church group to meet
90
on school premises would not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice
White reasoned that the allowance did not establish religion via the state
because the film would have been shown in the evening and would not have
been sponsored by the school.9' However, the Court continued its analysis
utilizing an endorsement approach.92 The majority ruled that because the
school had been open to a wide variety of other private organizations,
allowing Lamb's Chapel to use the facilities would not have been viewed
93
by the community as the school district "endorsing religion."
Although several "tests" were now available with which the Court
could analyze an Establishment Clause issue, again in 1993 another model,
the "breadth of coverage" test, was articulated in Zobrest v. Catalina
94
The isgue in Zobrest was whether it was
Foothills School District.
constitutional for the state to provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf
95
In Zobrest, a
student who attended a sectarian (religious) school.
government program provided any challenged student with a personal
assistant who would accompany the student to school. 96 Justice Rehnquist,
87. Id.; see also Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (holding mandatory graduation attendance by the secondary students to a ceremony
including religious prayer resulted in unconstitutional coercion by the state).
88. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
89. Id. at 389. The church wished to show a six-part film series by Dr. James Dobson,
a recognized psychologist, concerning parenting froma Christian perspective. Id. at 387-88.
90. Id. at 395.
91. Id.

92. Here, the court seemed to be combining the first two prongs of the Lemon test and
interchanged the word "endorsement" with "advancement" of religion referred to in the
second "primary effect" prong. Id. at 395 (referring to the three-part test articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)).
93. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.

94. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
95. Id. at 5-7.
96. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4. Zobrest, deaf since birth, attended a Roman Catholic High
School in Tucson, Arizona. Zobrest asked the school district to provide him with a public
employed interpreter pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the
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speaking for the majority, stressed that the Supreme Court had consistently
ruled that neutral government programs that provided benefits to a wide
range of citizens without reference to religion "are not readily subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also
receive an attenuated financial benefit., 97 The Court reasoned that denying
Zobrest use of this publicly sponsored program would have adverse and
extreme results.98 Consequently, the majority decided that a state-paid
educational program in which assistance was given, without regard or
incentive, to a sectarian institution was constitutionally valid. 99
Finally, in 1994 the Supreme Court ended the modem Establishment
Clause reign of confusion, not by revitalizing the ailing Lemon test, but by
"pursu[ing] a course of 'neutrality' toward religion."' 00 In Board of
Education v. Grumet,'0 ' New York taxpayers challenged a statute that
created a school district specifically for the community of Kiryas Joel, a
Satmar Hasidim enclave.10 2 Kiryas Joel was a religious community
located within the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District. In 1989, the
state legislature, with full knowledge of the extremely close, religious nature
of the Kiryas Joel enclave, created a separate district in this area.0 3
Governor Cuomo stated that the New York legislature was acting in a "good
faith effort to solve the unique problem" associated with providing Kiryas
Joel's handicapped children with proper education.'04
The Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated the Establishment
Clause.'0 5 Justice Souter reasoned that a test of neutrality allows the state
to accommodate religious needs within its jurisdiction without violating the
Establishment Clause. 0 6 However, here, the statute violated the test
because the statute departed from neutrality "by delegating the State's

statute's Arizona counterpart. Id.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) which noted that
without this rule churches would be unable to benefit from firefighter services or have their
sidewalks repaired).
99. Id. at 12-13.
100. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,696 (1994) (citing Committee for Public
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973)).

101. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
102. Id. at 690. Satmar Hasidic sect practices avery strict form of Judaism. The sect

takes its
name from the town near the Hungarian and Romanian border where in the early

years of this century, the group molded into a distinct community. Id.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 690.
See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705.
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discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its
character as a religious community."' 1 7 Thus, New York was favoring
one form of religion over another, rendering the unusual New York act
unconstitutional.' 08
In summary, when a plaintiff expresses concern surrounding the
Establishment Clause, or a defense is raised in 'fear of violating the
Establishment Clause, the Court may apply any one of the numerous "tests"
mentioned above.' 0 9 If the Court embraces the Lemon test, all three
prongs of the model must be met before the state successfully defeats a
constitutional violation." 0 However, if the Court applies a test of "benevolent neutrality," the state must merely pass a threshold of accommodation,
by neither advancing or prohibiting religion, to escape conflicts with the
Establishment Clause."' In recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Court has adopted a more "neutral" oriented application. Nevertheless, it
is undeniably apparent in modem opinions by the Court, that Lemon
in the
principles refined and renamed continue to function prominently
2
Supreme Court's analysis of the Establishment Clause."
In Rosenberger,"3 the Supreme Court attempted, once again, to
interpret and define this fluctuating area of the First Amendment referred to
as the Establishment Clause. Unfortunately, the Court's explanation of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence merely added more uncertainty and yet
another model to the plethora of viable analyses that already existed.

II.

ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR & VISITORS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

A. FACTS OF THE CASE

The University of Virginia is a public university of the Commonwealth
of Virginia." 4 Each year approximately 17,000 students attend classes on
To encourage educational development and campus
the campus."

107. Id. at 696.
108. Id.
109. This probably excludes the historical test from Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), which after Lee v. Weisman seems to have a limited application to actions of the
legislatures. 505 U.S. 577, 596-97 (1992).
110. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
111. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705.
112. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
113. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
114. Id. at 2513.
115. Id. at 2514.
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awareness, the University has created a program to aid extracurricular
student activities conducted on the campus." 6
. The program, in part, provides funds to pay
for a student organization's
bills from outside contractors such as printing and advertising companies. " 7 However, before an organization is eligible to receive these funds,
it must first gain status as a Contracted Independent Organization
("CIO"). 18 Obtaining CIO status requires a majority of the members of
the organization to be students, the officers of the group to be full-time
students, an updated copy of the organization's constitution to be on file,
and the student group to have signed an anti-discrimination disclaimer. "
Moreover, the CIO must provide a disclaimer when distributing materials
which states that the activity is independent of the University. 20 Once a
student group is granted CIO status by meeting these criteria, the organization is entitled to use the University's computer rooms and printers, the
classrooms on campus, and many other University facilities.' 2 '
Once recognized as a CIO, student organizations also enjoy the right
to apply for funds to pay for outside contracts from the Student Activities
Fund ("SAF"). 122 The SAF disbursal funds are generated by a mandatory
student fee of fourteen dollars per semester paid by every full-time
University student. 23 Operation of the fund has been delegated by the
Rectors and Visitors of the University to the University of Virginia Student
Council. 24 The Student Council, as the governing body, must grant
requests for funding in a manner "consistent with the educational purpose
of the University of Virginia."' 2 5 One stated purpose is news and infor116. Id. The University realized that a wide range of available opportunities greatly
enhance the on-campus environment at the University. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 18 F.3d 269, 270
(4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). The disclaimer merely states that the
organization will pledge not to discriminate in its membership approval. Rosenberger,115
S. Ct. at 2514.
120. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514. The disclaimer signed by the student
organization states the support provided by the University to the CIOs is not to be viewed
as "meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled by the University, that the
University is responsible for the organizations' contract,... or that the University approves
of the organizations' goals or activities." Id.
121. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 270.
122. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2514.
123. Id.
124. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 271.
125. Id. However, the Student Council's determinations are subject to review by
Student Activities Committee, a University faculty board. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2514.
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mation for the student such as entertainment, or communications from the
University, or other media groups. 6 However, some CIOs may not be
reimbursed by the SAF.127 Religious activities, fraternities and sororities,
activities, and political activities, are denied
philanthropic contributions and
28
support.
access to any SAF
In the fall of 1990, Ronald Rosenberger founded Wide Awake
Productions ("WAP").' 29 The stated objective of this organization is to
"publish a magazine of philosophical and religious expression, to facilitate
discussion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of
Christian viewpoint, and to provide a unifying focus for Christians of
multicultural backgrounds."' 30 WAP is not associated with any one
allows access to any student wishing to
denomination and the organization
3'
Christianity.1
about
more
learn
Shortly after the group was initiated, WAP began publishing and
dispersing Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of
Virginia to University students. 32 The Christian viewpoint was declared
in the mission stated by the editors: "to challenge Christians to live, in
word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ
means."' 33 Articles printed in the first and subsequent issues of the paper
eating disorders, and
covered concerns about teenage pregnancy, racism,
34
books.
religious
and
reviews of religious music
Soon after its creation, WAP was granted CIO status, allowing the
organization access to University facilities. 3 A few months later, WAP
applied for reimbursement from SAF for a printing contract in the amount
of $5,862. 36 SAF denied WAP's request reasoning that Wide Awake was
126. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514. SAF grants funds to the Muslim Student
Association and the Jewish Law Students Association. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 288.
127. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
128. Id. A religious activity is defined by the University as any activity that primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. Id. at
2515. For examples of those that have been denied, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a-63a.
129. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
130. Id. at 2515.

131. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 272.

132. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2515. The cost figure represented the expenses to date
of producing all of the disbursed issues of Wide Awake. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 177 (1992), aff'd, 18 F.3d 269 (1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 2510 (1995).
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a religious activity as stated in the guidelines; therefore, the organization
could not be subsidized by SAF.' WAP immediately took its grievance
to the full Student Council and the Council denied the appeal.'
The
Student Activities Committee, the next level of appeal sought by WAP,
affirmed the Council's determination. 9 Without further recourse within
the University of Virginia, WAP filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia. 4 °
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At trial, Rosenberger contended that the denial of student activity funds
comprised of mandatory student fees violated his right to freedom of speech,
freedom of press, and freedom of religion.' 4 ' Both Rosenberger and the
University of.Virginia filed motions for summary judgment agreeing that
there existed no genuine issue of material fact. 42 The District Court
granted the Board of Rector and Visitors' motion, concluding that the SAF
was a non-public forum."" Applying the test of reasonableness, the court
concluded that the SAF guidelines for refusal were reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expressions the University disliked."' Consequently,
the court found, as a matter of law, that Rosenberger's right to freedom of
speech had not been violated.'
The trial judge also held that the right
to freedom of religion had not been unconstitutionally violated. 46
Applying the test proffered by Rosenberger, the trial court did not consider
the burden on the religious organization to be substantial. 47 However, the
court emphasized that if it were to find a substantial burden, it was bound
by the Fourth Circuit's holding in Goodall v. Stafford County School
Board,148 which stated that the fear of an Establishment Clause violation

137. Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 177.
138. Id.
139. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d'at 274.
140. Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. 175 (W.D. Va. 1992).
141. Id. at 177-78. All allegations were stated to be in violation of the United States
Constitution, the Virginia Constitution, and the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom.
Rosenberger also alleged that the denial violated protection of the laws according to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 178.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 181.
144. Id.
145. See Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 182.
146. Id. at 183.
147. Id.
148. 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

constitutes a compelling state interest.'49 Therefore, even if a substantial
burden was present, the compelling state interest would validate the
Consequently, as a
restriction placed on the SAF by the University.'
of Rectors and
Board
the
of
favor
in
ruled
judge
trial
the
matter of law,
5'
Visitors of the University of Virginia.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a unanimous
decision, affirmed the holding."5 2 However, the three Justices of the
While
Circuit Court sharply disagreed with the trial court's rationale.'
the court agreed with the test briefly mentioned in the trial court's opinion,
the Circuit Court held that the University's refusal to provide funding to
WAP was based on an unconstitutional condition directly in violation of the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."' After a brief lesson in the
history of the creation of the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights, the
court emphasized that the Clause, although intended to secure every
citizen's absolute right to speak, does not promise "that the federal
government will purchase a bullhorn . . . for the convenience of every
garrulous member of the American populace.""' However, the court then
made an about face and declared that because the funding condition requires

149. Goodall, 930 F.2d at 370.
150. Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 183.
151. The trial court analyzed, as well, issues concerning a Free Speech Clause violation.
The court determined that SAF was a nonpublic forum. Consequently, the University's
restrictions were deemed reasonable, rendering the SAF's actions constitutional.
Rosenberger,795 F. Supp. at 181. The court also held that because that the University's
restrictions were not based on discriminatory intent, WAP's right to equal protection under
the law was not violated. Id. at 183. However, the scope of this paper will only cover the
Establishment Clause issue scrutinized in the Appellate Court and Supreme Court decisions.
152. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 288. Apparently, on appeal, Rosenberger failed to brief
or argue his allegations pursuant to the Constitution of Virginia or the Virginia Act for
Religious Freedom. Consequently, the Circuit Court ruled it was precluded from considering
those issues on appeal. Id. at 276.
153. Chief Judge Ervin delivered the opinion of the court. Judge Williams and Senior
Circuit Judge Sprouse concurred in the decision. Id. at 270.
154. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 280. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
states, in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
155. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 277. The Court seems to want it to be understood what
the Founding Fathers intended to create when they molded the Bill of Rights together. The
court cited the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights and the first ten amendments to the
Federal Constitution. Id. Quoting Justice Story's expression, the court stated "[t]hat this
amendment was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to speak, or write, or
print, whatever he might please ... without prior restraint .. " Id. at 278 (quoting 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES sec. 980, at
703-04 (1833).
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Wide Awake to be free from sectarian content to receive monies, the
provision is unconstitutional. 15 6 The guideline violated the Free Speech
and Press Clause because it left WAP at a financial disadvantage to other
student organizations eligible to receive funds.'57 Nevertheless, shedding
a ray of light on the perplexing background provided in the introduction of
the opinion, the court recognized the compelling concern of an Establishment Clause violation raised by the University board. 5 ' The Rector and
Visitors contended that, in this particular situation, it would be a violation
of the Establishment Clause if they were to fund the Wide Awake publication.'59 To determine whether the apprehensions of the Rector and
Visitors were genuine, the court analyzed the existing actions by the
University. Joining with many other courts of appeals,' 6 the Fourth
Circuit proceeded to acknowledge that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
dictates that a government activity does
not violate the Clause if the policy
61
passes the three-prong Lemon test.'
First, the court briefly mentioned and acknowledged the Rector and
Visitors' expressed purpose, to advance the University of Virginia's
education mission, as being sincere and secular in nature.162 However, the
court was significantly more wary in its analysis of the second, primary
effect prong. 163 Justice Ervin cautioned that appropriating monies to WAP
would most certainly advance religion, whereas the present status of WAP
still allows the organization access to campus grounds and facilities, a far
cry from inhibiting religion. 164 Finally, the Court reached the excessive
entanglement prong of the test. Concerned that subsidization of Wide
Awake, a facially religious publication, might enhance the position of WAP
and create divisive political affects, the Fourth Circuit Court held that
65
entanglement is a valid consideration of the Rector and Visitors.

156. Id. at 281.

157. Id.

158. Id. at 281-82.
159. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 282.
160. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
162. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 284.
163. Id. at 285. The court notes that herein lies the majority of the Establishment
Clause violations (citing School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383-98 (1985) (holding the
primary effect of a school district's shared time program would be to advance religion in
violation of the second prong of the Lemon test)).
164. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 285.
165. Id. at 286.
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Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 66 decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of the Rector and Visitors.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
"[w]hether the Establishment Clause compels a state university to exclude
an otherwise eligible student publication from participation in the student
activities fund, solely on the basis of its religious viewpoint, where such
exclusion would violate the Free Speech and Press Clauses if the viewpoint
of the publication were nonreligious.' 67
C. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Court began by emphasizing the Free Speech and Press Clause of
the First Amendment. 6 Citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District,69 Justice Kennedy noted that government may not
exclude speech purely on the basis of viewpoint discrimination.7 0 The
Court did consider the line between valid content discrimination and
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.' 7' However, without a detailed
explanation, Justice Kennedy immediately declared that the SAF guidelines
were a form of viewpoint discrimination.' 72 Therefore, because the
University's reason for excluding WAP from receiving funds, specifically
stated, was the religious views expressed by Wide Awake, the Court held
the action invoked by SAF's regulations was a denial of Rosenberger's free
speech right protected by the First Amendment.'
By contrast, the dissent reasoned that the University was excluding
religious activities on the basis of content discrimination which, as
mentioned by the majority, was a permissible regulation.'"" Justice
Souter, writing for the dissent, argued that the purpose of the Free Speech
Clause was to prevent the government from inhibiting public debate by

166. Id. at 288.
167. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2521
(1995).
168. Id. at 2516.
169. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
170. Rosenberger,115 S.Ct. at 2517. The Court's conclusion in Lamb's Chapelwas
unanimous, holding that the school board discriminated because it permitted school rooms
to be used to present various views on family issues and raising children, but denied access
to another group who wished to present those issues from a religious standpoint. Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95.
171. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2517.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2520.
174. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2547-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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suppressing one or several viewpoints on a given subject.'7 5 The dissent
stressed that the exclusionary provisions utilized by the Student Council
denied funds to any activity seeking access that "primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief in or about a deity .... 176 Characterizing
Wide Awake as a journal of "Christian advocacy" with "evangelical efforts,"
the dissent contended that the University simply denied funds to any
organization whose activities promoted any view on the merits of religion.' 77 Consequently, the dissent would have affirmed the appellate
court's decision in favor of the University because the implemented
regulations did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.'
Returning to the majority, the Court analyzed whether the constitutional
violation of the Free Speech Clause is excused by the necessity of the
government to comply with the Establishment Clause.' 79 Without regard
to the Lemon test, Justice Kennedy recognized, instead, that when faced with
an issue surrounding the Establishment Clause "neutrality towards religion"
is a significant factor in upholding governmental programs. 80
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that when the State implemented
"neutral criteria and evenhanded policies," the State avoided a constitutional
violation of the Establishment Clause.'
Consequently, the Court held
that the University's program was neutral toward religion because the fund
supported student journals and Wide Awake is a student journal, expressing
merely one viewpoint regarding subjects such as racism. 2 Noting that
monies extracted from the public to directly support or establish specific
religions is blatantly unconstitutional, the Court maintained that the SAF
175. Id. at 2548-49 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2549 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent urges that the discrimination would
apply to Muslims, Jews, Buddhist, as well as Christian attempting to promote, evangelistically, that particular sect. Therefore, the guidelines deny all debate concerning religion and
refuse to fund any one position taken concerning religion. Id.
178. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2551 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2520-24. However, the Court seems less than enthused about doing so.
Apparently the University no longer pressed the Establishment Clause issue by the time the
case made its way to the Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy remarked that such a change in
heart somehow lent even more weight to the majority's position that the clause would not be
violated by allowing WAP to receive monies from the SAF. Id. at 2521.
180. Id. at 2521. Justice Kennedy briefly outlined Establishment Clause jurisprudence
by citing cases such as Everson, Widmar, Mergens and Grumet. Id. at 2521-22. The Court
must "be sure that [it does] not inadvertently prohibit [the government] from extending its
general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief." Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
181. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
182. Id. at 2522.
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appropriations to WAP were constitutional. They declared that the student
fees were "a far cry from a general public assessment designed . . . to
provide financial support for a church."' 83 The majority further noted that
government neutrality exists because of the disclaimer signed by any
organization receiving funds." 4 The disclaimer disassociates the University from the funded group; thus there is no reasonable likelihood that the
view expressed will be seen as an endorsement or coercion by the State. 5
Finally, the majority compared the support Wide Awake would receive
86
to the access granted on a religious-neutral basis in Widmar v. Vincent.
In Widmar, religious organizations were allowed to meet in classrooms
during the evenings as were other community groups.'8 7 The Court
reasoned that providing such services required maintenance of the facilities,
heat, and electricity which in turn required government to expend money.
In this case, printing services would be provided to WAP which would
require the University to expend monies as well. The nature of the benefit
received in both cases was merely neutrally-based services. 8 Therefore,
the Court held the "neutrality commanded of the State" by the Establishment
Clause was violated by the University's SAF guidelines. 9
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor refrained the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence of the majority opinion. She perceived that the test
should center around the message conveyed by governmental actions: "the
message [should be] one of neutrality, rather than endorsement."' 9 °
Noting that this case was close to the brink of funding being viewed as an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority in holding that providing funds to pay for WAP printing contract
would not violate the Establishment Clause.'' In doing so, she urged the
Court to apply Establishment Clause jurisprudence on a case-by-case
method, rather than using a test for every fact pattern that raises Establishment Clause questions.'92 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor concluded that

183.
184.
185.
Lynch v.
186.
(1981).
187.
188.
189.
190.
opinions.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 2522-23.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
Id. at 2525.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor has promoted this view in several
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 670, 687 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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assisting Wide Awake would not result in endorsement of the student
journal because (1) the student organization is completely independent of the
University via the agreement signed by WAP denouncing any connection to
the University, (2) the requirement of submitting a request to receive funds
ensures that the monies will only be appropriated for permissible University
purposes, and (3) Wide Awake is one of fifteen other student journals
published; therefore, this adds even more assurance that the public will not
consider the University's actions as an endorsement of Wide Awake's
particular viewpoint.' 93
By contrast, following a detailed explanation as to the intent and
purpose of the First Amendment, the dissent interpreted the jurisprudence
of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting any form of direct governmental
funding of religion.'9 4 Justice Souter, writing for a four-person dissent,
attacked the funding of Wide Awake as a "direct [government] subsidization
of preaching the word" and held that such support is a categorical violation
of the Establishment Clause.' 95 However, Justice Souter urged that even
in the event there is doubt as to an Establishment Clause violation,
evenhandedness of the government activity or statute does not assure success
under the Establishment Clause scrutiny.'96 Therefore, in the dissent's
view, a stricter scrutiny of the purpose and effect of the University's
regulations was necessary, beyond the majority's "neutrality" test, to
determine a constitutional violation. 9 ' The dissent disagreed with the
majority's opinion that printing services are, in an economical sense,
indistinguishable from access to facilities and classrooms.'
Furthermore,
the dissent declared that the SAF is public monies and therefore, although
not a tax in the pure sense of the word, should be analyzed as a tax."'
Due to the "frankly evangelistic character" of the journal and the SAF
directly subsidizing the journal's publication, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's holding that the University guidelines were unconstitutional.2 "'
Consequently, in the dissent's opinion, the guidelines were necessary to

193. Id. at 2526-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).

195. Id. at 2535-44 (Souter, J., dissenting).

196. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2539-43 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent argues "[e]venhandedness as
one element of a permissibly attenuated benefit is, of course, a far cry from evenhandedness
as a sufficient condition of constitutionality for direct financial support of religious
proselytization ..
" Id. at 2542 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2534 (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2547 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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protect the University against a violation of the Establishment Clause.2 '
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion simply to convey his
disagreement with the dissent's historical analysis of the Establishment
Clause.20 2 Although Justice Thomas agreed that one should begin with the
ideas and concerns voiced by James Madison during the conception of the
First Amendment, he felt that the dissent misconstrued Madison's position.2" 3 According to Justice Thomas, the application of history should
yield a position of accommodation "allowing religious adherents to
' 204
participate on equal terms in neutral government programs.
III. ANALYSIS

Although the Rosenberger Court concluded that the University of
Virginia did not violate the Establishment Clause by providing funds to
WAP, the Court reached this conclusion by adopting a test of "benevolent
neutrality., 20 5 The neutrality test embraced by the RosenbergerCourt was
not only misapplied in reference to Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District,0 6 the analysis enunciated failed to reach a
meaningful, tangible result.
By focusing on the neutral impact of the restriction, the Court escaped
the difficult task of analyzing the case based on a more fact-intensive
standard. 2 7 Further, using a neutral test avoided the unpopular result of
hostility toward religion. The unappreciative outcome, that of restricting
religious activities to a proper time and place, yet allowing seemingly
obnoxious secular activities to occur ad nauseum, is a common result when
the Supreme Court takes a separatist view toward religion.2 8
However, use of this test also has its detractors. First, in modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a majority of the Supreme Court
Justices refuse to conform to any Establishment Clause analysis except the
201. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2528 (Thomas, J., concurring).
203. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2528 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2524-25
(1995).
206. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
207. JusticeKennedy merely stated that when the government followed "neutral criteria"
using evenhanded policies, the State successfully avoided an Establishment Clause violation.
However, he neglected to indicate any useful examples as to what would and would not be
considered by the Court as an evenhanded policy. That allusive line remains blurred.
Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2521.
208. Proponents of the "neutral" model of analysis criticize the Lemon test as creating
undue hostility toward religion. See supra note 8-9 and accompanying text.
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1971 Lemon test.2 °9 Without a majority in agreement as to the proper

inquiry, developing a comprehensive analysis in the future will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, the Court's recent "adoption" of
the broad and evasive "neutrality test" leaves the lower courts, the bar, and
school boards throughout the nation, questioning how the Court will
interpret various actions that may somehow encompass religion.
1,
Second, the application of a "neutrality test" allows the Court to tailor
its analysis to achieve its chosen result. Justices on both sides of modem
Establishment Clause jurisprudence have captured the test and manipulated
it to achieve the desired effect.21 0 Thus, the Supreme Court leaves little
to, guide those who follow to sort through the numerous conflicting

opinions.

By contrast, the Lemon test, although heavily criticized and mangled,2 ' leads to a more acceptable, consistent result if diligently applied.'
Although some commentators have repudiated the Lemon
2
3
test, " and some have redesigned the test, 21 4 lower courts still consistently apply the three-prong model. 215 Further, while there is a danger
that religion may be singled out and excluded from certain benefits, the
Lemon test 216 protects society against an even greater danger: governmental support and involvement in religion." 7 This fundamental safeguard
209. See generally Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)(citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). The numerous concurring and dissenting opinions
provide a glimpse of the current state of confusion surrounding the uncertain "benevolent
neutrality" test.
210. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696-97. In Grumet, Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter
both used the "neutrality" test to find that the State's delegation of authority violated the
Constitution. Id. at 717-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, Justice Scalia, also using
the "neutrality" test, decided that the actions by the State of New York were neutral because
the law sought to meet the "special educational needs of... handicapped children." Id. at
742-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. See supra note 8-9 and accompanying text.
212. For a comprehensive review of the Lemon test and plausible alterations, see supra
notes 4 and 10 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 718-21
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (calling for abandonment of the Lemon test in furtherance of a
more appropriate "endorsement" test that must be applied in a case-by-case fashion).
214. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 451 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1171 (7th Cir. 1993); Jones
v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1992); Sands v. Morongo
Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 813 (Cal. 1991); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1077
(11 th Cir. 1991); Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 833 (11 th Cir. 1989).
216. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
217. Madison was a significant and influential framer of the Constitution of the United
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was insisted on by the Framers of the United States Constitution. Therefore,
because the Supreme Court in Rosenbergermisapplied a lead case and failed
to recognize the precedential Lemon model, the Court reached an incorrect
conclusion.
A. INCONSISTENT WITH LAMB'S CHAPEL

The Court misapplied the facts and rationale of Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District,"' a case decided only two
years earlier. In Lamb's Chapel, the school district denied the chapel's
request to show a six-part film series on parenting in one of the school's

classrooms." 9 The Supreme Court held that allowing the chapel access
would not be an "establishment of religion."22 One key distinction
between Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger was the absence of a request for
" ' The chapel did not ask the school to pay for the rental of the
funding.22
six films or the printing of the flyers used to promote the showing of the
parenting film series. As Justice White pointed out, there would have been
"no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was
endorsing religion ..... 22 However, in Rosenberger, WAP requested
funds from a government entity to pay for the organization's publication.223 Here, supporting a religious organization so directly would most
certainly be seen by the community as government endorsing religion.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy allusively cited Lamb's Chapel as a justification
for the Court's general position that Free Speech rights must not be denied
simply to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.224
States of America. Much insight can be gleaned from James Madison's Memorial and

RemonstranceAgainstReligiousAssessments, which played the central role in ensuring the

defeat of the Virginia tax assessment bill in 1786 and framed the discourse upon which the
Establishment Clause is founded. In Madison's Remonstrance,he declared: " ... that no

person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution of
any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly
free; and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established

religions." (2 JAMES MADISON, Memorialand RemonstranceAgainstReligiousAssessments,

in the Writings of James Madison 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)), reprinted in Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947).
218. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
219. Id. at 388-89.
220. Id. at 395.

221. Id. at 388-89.
222. Id. at 395.

223. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.

224. Justice Kennedy made this general statement in support of the proposition that
WAP's right to speak on religious views should not be oppressed to protect the State from
an Establishment Clause violation. Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2522. While this may be true
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B. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE THREE-PRONG LEMON TEST

The Supreme Court sought to find the allocation of student fees to
religious campus publications constitutional. The alacrity with which the
Court reached this end resulted in a suspiciously broad application of a
undeveloped test. Most notable was the omission of any significant
discussion concerning Lemon v. Kurtzman.225 The Lemon test is functional and leads to a reasonable and logical conclusion, when applied correctly.
An application of the three prongs of the Lemon test (the action must have
a secular purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and the action must not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion)226 to the SAF program free of any
regulations effectively renders the appropriation of student activity funds to
WAP unconstitutional.
1. Secular PurposeProng
The first prong of the Lemon test, a primary purpose which is secular
in nature,22 7 is easily surpassed. The University's stated primary purpose
was to provide SAF support to qualified student organizations in an attempt
to "support a broad range of extracurricular student activities that are related
to the educational purpose of the University."22' 8 The funding of student
news, information, opinion, and entertainment publications achieves the
University's goal. Therefore, the RosenbergerCourt has little difficulty, and
is so justified, in determining that the University's stated purpose expressed
a genuine, secular tone.
2. PrimaryEffect Prong
The second prong, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion,229 creates significantly greater difficulties. Unfortunately, the
Court misconstrued a key element involved in this prong's analysis, making
in certain circumstances, the Court must still apply the facts of the case before it to determine
if, by protecting an organization's freedom to speak, the government would in turn be
unconstitutionally supporting a religious activity.
225. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The entire Court neglected to recognize the leading case in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Lemon test was not mentioned in any majority
opinion, and dissenting Justice Souter did not mention the case either, only to give reference
in the last paragraph of his opinion to the warnings of Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 2551
(Souter, J., dissenting).
226. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
227. 403 U.S. at 612.
228. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
229. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the examination of the test even more complex. By ignoring the candid
character of the publication disseminated by WAP, the majority professed
a misguided sense of confidence that the WAP publication is merely the
23 ° The
expression of one viewpoint surrounding various secular topics.
Court declared that because the journal is a form of "student news, information, opinion [or] entertainment on student life issues, it should be funded
on a neutral basis to provide the students with a diverse University
experience."23'
By contrast, had the Court appropriately analyzed the second prong, the
publication itself would have been scrutinized in greater detail. First, the
primary effect at issue in Rosenberger was whether a state university's aid
232
to a religious publication has the primary effect of advancing religion.
Advancement of religion can be the result of attracting new believers or
233 Wide
converting others from their religion to the religion expressed.
Awake is a journal primarily devoted to the discussion and advancement of
Christianity. Nothing about the journal indicates any attempt to simply
discuss a secular issue from a Christian viewpoint; every article is overflowing with evangelistic references. Further, the journal's primary purpose
stated on the opening page of each issue is "to challenge Christians to live,
in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ
means." 234 Therefore, because enhancement of Christianity is WAP's
purpose in publishing Wide Awake, funding the publication of a evangelistic
journal for student-wide dissemination certainly leads to a promotion of
Christianity. Students who read the messages of Saint Paul likely feel
compelled to follow the teachings of Jesus Christ. In the more general sense
of the term, Wide Awake is a religious institution,235 and funding the
publication will unquestionably promote, enhance, or advance religion.

230. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515 (reciting that the WAP articles concern serious
issues such as racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, and prayer).
231. Id. at 2522.
232. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding that because the
programs in question subsidize the religious function of parochial schools, the programs have
the primary effect of advancing religion). But see supra note 4 at 645-46 (advancing the
theory that the primary effect "should be gauged on its effect in light of the goals of the
program in toto").
233. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 967 (5th Cir. 1992).
234. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2534.
235. Justice Kennedy disagreed, stating in the majority that although the Court must
protect against the State subsidizing a Church's activities, such a danger was not present here
because Wide Awake was not a religious institution "in the usual sense of that term." Id. at
2524.
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However, the state is also prohibited from inhibiting religion. While
advocates of the WAP journal may argue that religion cannot be inhibited
either, sustaining the University's religious activity restriction will not
unduly burden WAP. As the majority clearly acknowledged, the University
provides in-house availability to University printers and classrooms to all
student organizations. 6 Therefore, although they are denied the funds for
contractor printing, WAP, through many other available forums, is not
prohibited from declaring Christianity to anyone who will listen and read on
University grounds. They may print flyers on University printers, speak to
passersby on campus, and hold meetings in University classrooms to express
their religious beliefs. Consequently, because WAP is only slightly inhibited
if the university restricts SAF monies, the University should be allowed to
prohibit the subsidization of Wide Awake to avoid an unconstitutional
advancement of religion.
3. Excessive Government Entanglement Prong
The final prong of the Lemon test, the excessive entanglement
prong,237 is where most commentators find inherent opposition within the
test.238 In general, government entanglement must be excessive before the
State will be found in violation of the Establishment Clause. To that extent,
direct funding of religious projects with public funds has routinely been
declared excessive entanglement. 239 However, because the Court declines
to view the student fee as a tax and, in addition, inserts the printer as a third
party between the government and WAP, the Court erroneously declared the
University's restrictions unacceptable.
First, the majority effortlessly distinguished the mandatory student fees
collected by the University from a public tax.240 Justice Kennedy believed
the fees to be an "exaction" designated to reflect the necessities of student
life.24 ' A "tax" is defined as "any contribution imposed by government
upon individuals, for the use and service of the state, whether under the

236. Id.
237. 403 U.S. at 613.
238. For further explanation on the paradox that exists within the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test, see supra note 4 at 647 and accompanying text.
239. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 640 (1971) (citing Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
240. Rosenberger,115 S.Ct. at 2522 (recognizing that if the student fees were deemed
a "tax," those fees would, of course, violate the Establishment Clause of the United States

Constitution).
241. Id.
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In Rosenberger,

students are required by an arm of the State to pay a compulsory activity fee
in the sum of fourteen dollars per semester.243 They may not decline to
pay the fee, nor may they indicate the manner in which they wish it to be
allocated. This involuntary "exaction" is nothing less than a tax. And the
use of this tax for the direct subsidization of any religious activity or
institution is categorically prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 4
Nevertheless, the Rosenberger Court attempted to reason that because
the funds are sent to a third party, the printer, the funds are most definitely
not a government allocation providing financial support to a religious
institution.245 However, unlike Zobrest,246 where a student was given
state aid and could make a personal decision as to which school to attend,
here the printer is only allocated the monies if WAP chooses to use their
services. The contractor will most assuredly utilize the funds to pay WAP's
bill instead of using the monies to print another publication. The allocation
is void of any personal, independent decision by the recipient. Consequently, by allowing SAF to directly or indirectly subsidize the printing of Wide
Awake, the University would be excessively entangled in religion, thereby
violating the Establishment Clause.
Application of the Lemon test, 247 as utilized by lower courts and

mentioned by at least four Supreme Court Justices, demands that the
University's restriction of the SAF be upheld. The Supreme Court
abandoned this test and instead chose to permit WAP's request for
University subsidization. Nonetheless, while ignoring the test, the Court
made reference to several of the underpinnings of the twenty-year-old, threeprong test developed by the Lemon Court. However, in the end, the
Rosenberger Court managed to manipulate a few facts and ignore others to
arrive at a result inapposite to the conclusion of Lemon's true application.
In short, the University's fears of violating the Establishment Clause were
well founded. The University of Virginia would have been in violation of

242. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1457 (6th ed. 1990).
243. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.

244. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1947) (declaring that "the
establishment of religion means at least [that] [n]o tax in any amount large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities."). Justice O'Connor also recognized this forbidden
act by government in her concurring opinion where she emphasized that "prior decisions...
provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities." Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
245. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
246. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

1996]

LIFE WITHOUT LEMON

the Constitution had they not implemented the "religious activity" allocation
restriction on student activity funds.
C. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS

The Court's decision in Rosenberger, that "indirect" support of a
religious activity is permissible so long as the allocation of support is
"neutral" supporting both religion and irreligion, will have a profound
impact on Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Although the Rosenberger
decision elevates the degree of hostility toward religion, it provides
significant opportunity to support one religion over another. Without
providing lower courts, state legislatures, and local school boards with any
relief from the impossible chaos surrounding this issue, the Supreme Court
opened the courtroom door to "evangelistic" paraphernalia around the
nation.
Once again, the Supreme Court missed an excellent opportunity to
recapture and revitalize the Lemon test by incorporating "neutrality" into the
second and third prongs of the model.24
In the past six years, the
majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court have clearly favored a test of
accommodation of religion, distancing themselves from the earlier Court's
position of complete separation between State and Church.249 Yet not one
Justice has been able to enunciate a test that would amount to a standard by
which to apply all Establishment Clause cases.250 With religion playing
an important role in Western civilization,2"' and with government being
248. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. Although it is difficult to modify
the mangled Lemon test after twenty years of use and reuse, the Court should reanalyze
the
test based on a new fact pattern. The primary purpose prong has given the courts
little
difficulty. However, the primary effect prong and excessive entanglement prong need
the
Court's attention. Since it is evident that a majority of the Justices on the Court favor a
test
of "neutrality" and accommodation toward religion, the clear tone of separatism should
be
alleviated by requiring excessive entanglement to be found only when government
must
monitor the "religious" nature of an entity.
249. Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, all
seem in agreement that the test to be carried forward is "benevolent neutrality," but they
do
not agree on exactly how to apply it, as evidenced by the separate concurring opinion
of
Justice Kennedy versus the three-man dissent of Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia in Grumet. See generally Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
Justice O'Connor, as well, often is in agreement with Justice Kennedy as to treating
the
Establishment Clause with a sense of neutrality, yet she often uses a test of endorsement
and
refuses to overrule Lemon. See, e.g., Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 720-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting "different
cases" call for "different approaches").
251. Nancy Gibbs, America's Holy War, TIME, Dec. 9, 1991, at 60, 64 (detailing
religion in present-day American life).
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an important figure in our everyday lives, the inconsistent positions taken
by the Supreme Court have created a serious gap that must be bridged.
Because the Court has again refused to meet this challenge, those on both
sides of this critical First Amendment issue must act with hesitation and
counsel, incurring unwanted and unfortunate expense to all.
Furthermore, the Rosenbergerdecision leaves society wondering which
religions government will choose to support and which ones it will choose
not to support. This is precisely the danger warned against in the 1700s by
Government involvement in religion leads to a
James Madison. 2
compulsory religious society, precisely the community of England from
which our Founders fled in search of freedom: freedom to practice and
express the religion of their choice. The University of Virginia was
instructed to pay for the dissemination of a Christian pamphlet. Could one
not assume that now the University would also be required to provide
University funds to all "religious" groups, be they as extreme as they
may."' The holding of Rosenbergerbegs the question: Where does State
support of religious activities stop?
A final implication suggests that student activity fees have yet to see
their last courtroom. By opening the door to university support of "religious
activities," the Court has left courts susceptible to an irritated student who
does not want "his" fee used to publish a religious journal. How the Court
will resolve this question depends on the disposition of the Free Speech
254 Perhaps
Clause and its interpretation as applied to the facts of the case.
the University of Virginia could avoid such a potential challenge in the near
future by permitting students to allocate the fourteen-dollar fee to an
organization of their choice based on a list of CIO status organizations listed
on their tuition bill. In short, the University of Virginia is not free and clear

How much religious influence is there?
Too much - I I percent; Too little - 55 percent; Just the right amount - 30 percent
Do you favor or oppose displaying Nativity scenes on government property?
Oppose - 26 percent; Favor - 67 percent
Do you favor or oppose removing references to God in public oaths by government
officials?
Oppose - 63 percent; Favor - 29 percent
252. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
253. If money is given to these people, will the school be required to also provide funds
to Branch Davidians, Hare Krishnas, snake-handlers and even Satanists?
254. This challenge is all too real. Justice O'Connor paid service to just such a
likelihood in the "finally" phase of her concurring opinion in Rosenberger. 115 S. Ct. at
2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(explaining that there is a current split in the lower courts
as to whether or not such a challenge would be fruitful).
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simply by paying for the publication of Wide Awake. The battle has just
begun, and the war is far from over.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence is mired in a morass of
conflicting opinions. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia,2" the Supreme Court refused to clear a path and instead
created still murkier waters. The Supreme Court utilized the "neutrality"
test to meet the desired end of allowing the government to fund religious
activities when it so funds secular functions. Although the support of
religious programs is a noble and politically favored aspiration, the Supreme
Court may not accomplish this goal by failing to acknowledge the basic
premise of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.256
The Supreme Court refused to follow previous cases and analyze
Rosenberger using the First Amendment-based Lemon test. By refusing to
expand upon or even acknowledge the validity of the Lemon test, the Court
ignored and corrupted an important policy protection behind the Establishment Clause: the distinction between Church and State. In Engel, the Court
explained the concern of government intervention into religion and the
detrimental effect it would inevitably produce.257 Justice Black emphasized that "a union of government and religion tends . . . to degrade
'
religion."258
In its personal empathy for religion, the Court overlooked the
underpinnings of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, creating
more chaos than clarity.
Few would disagree that suppression of religion is distasteful; however,
when government advances religion to avoid such an unwanted outcome, the
greater evil becomes government sponsorship of one religion over another.
Without the Lemon test and its useful framework, the Court may gradually
and unconscientiously create a system that defies the essence of the
Establishment Clause. As warned by Chief Justice Burger, "in constitutional
adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to approach 'the
verge' have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum
develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill thrust' easily set
'
in motion but difficult to retard or stop." 259
JULIE MADISON ANGUS

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
Id. at 431.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).

